Notwithstanding the reverses, the ISIS is back in reckoning. The first of its recent successes was at Ramadi in mid-May, which brought them within 70 miles of Baghdad
As published by Vivek, Vivekananda International Foundation in their May-June 2016 issue.
The ISIS flag flies from a few more masts across the Syrian - Iraqi landscape. Quite an achievement for an organization that a few months back was considered to be losing steam. In the last few weeks ISIS forces have notched up victories in both Syria and Iraq. There have been some success for the other parties too; but the scales have tipped in favour of ISIS.
The story at the beginning of 2015 was one of major reversals faced by the ISIS. In January, 2015, after protracted fighting, Kurdish forces drove them out of the strategically important town of Kobani, on the Syrian - Turkey borders. In April, another success story had followed at Tikrit, this time with Iraqi forces, Shiite and Sunni militias, Iranian assistance, US and UK air power coming together to deliver the blow. There was hope at that stage of ISIS having been effectively checkmated? In fact, the world was looking at retaking of Mosul as the next big Iraqi operation to initiate the grand rollback of the ISIS saga.
Notwithstanding the reverses, the ISIS is back in reckoning. The first of its recent successes was at Ramadi in mid-May, which brought them within 70 miles of Baghdad and gave them a better control over the Anwar province. The next victory was at the other end of the battlefield, Palmyra, an ancient Syrian town famous for its sculptures and monuments. Palmyra also gives the ISIS control of road networks in the region. It’s also in close proximity to gas fields that could further swell its coffers.
The reasons for ISIS successes can perhaps be traced back to the stance taken by some major players during the period after the loss of Mosul almost a year back, to that preceding the defeat at Ramadi. The Iraqi government failed to coalesce the strengths of the various groups that could have defended Ramadi. The Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF), primarily Shia militias, was not acceptable to some Sunni tribes given the reputation of the group’s violations post the victory at Tikrit. However, notwithstanding the fact files of Tikrit, the PMF had already operated jointly with Sunni militias in Anbar without displaying even a trace of the Tikrit legacy.
With the Shia militias out of the fight and Sunni tribes not having adequate political support at Baghdad to be armed there was in effect neither a synthesized strategy nor enough resources for the defence of Ramadi. ISIS launched its offensive hours after the PLF had withdrawn from Ramadi and captured the city.
‘At Palmyra it was a battle between Assad’s forces and the ISIS. Perhaps the bigger reason for the defeat was the dearth of air support. Palmyra is also Sunni majority; a fact that has again and again decisively influenced the resolve of Iraqi forces to hold out. Perhaps, the defeat also reflects the fatigue that the Iraqi Army experiences after years of combat.
Beyond the issues discussed above is the fact or fiction of ISIS leader Abu Bakr Al Baghdadi being seriously injured in March, 2015. There were reports of his death and jockeying for leadership with Abu Ala Afri ultimately taking over. Whether he is dead or alive, or for that matter a new leader has been anointed or not, in each of these circumstances a degree of confusion may have prevailed contributing to the reverses at Kobani and Tikrit. That phase, seemingly, is history now.
The other factor is the deep distrust with which Iran’s rise is viewed by Sunni Arab leadership of Gulf States. The issue was evident in the recent Camp David meet of Arab Gulf countries with President Obama. Some Arab leaders went to the extent of sending their deputies, viewing current American moves, especially the nuclear deal, as empowering Iran. Obama was able to make some progress in the all but impossible strategic balancing of American relations astride the Sunni States - Iran divide. His assurance that Bashar al Assad will have no role in Syria’s future also eased the other major apprehension of the Gulf States.
The cascading effects of Camp David were felt at the operational level in Ramadi, a week later. The Popular Mobilization Front, with its Shia identity and Iranian linkages, was not allowed to take to the field for Ramadi’s defence. At Palmyra too, it can be hypothetically argued, that if the Americans had pitched in, however impossible the suggestion may seem to be, the results could have been different.
Even with the best of resources, taming ISIS is quite a challenge. In Iraq, the Army is not up to the task. Kurds haven’t the resources. They have made some additional successes recently, however, beyond a point Baghdad would be apprehensive about their growing prowess. If the battle is to be won, the militias, both Sunni and Shia need to be used extensively just as a role for Iran requires acknowledgement. It’s a truth that Gulf states will need to come terms with. In Syria, if the tide is to be turned, the singular focus needs to be the ISIS at this stage. The current chaos with every group inimical to almost every other makes it a lot easier for ISIS.
A fundamental principle of war - Concentration of Forces - is in the bargain, clearly violated. Kurds haven’t the resources. They have made some additional successes recently, however, beyond a point Baghdad would be apprehensive about their growing prowess.
In both Iraq and Syria, considerable air effort and special operations will also need to be leveraged. As such, Americans and the rest of the countries that have deployed their resources will have to be ready for the long haul and accretions in force levels committed.
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